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Abstract 
In recent years, market power of small famers from developing countries has emerged 
as important economics issue. This market power is measured by the markup. We 
contribute to this literature by focusing on the exchanges between cashew farmers and 
buyers on Benin’s cashew domestic market. We use data on 261 cashew nut producers 
to highlight the determinants of farmers' markup in the Atacora-Donga region of Benin. 
The results show that the markup is significantly correlated with production and sales 
characteristics, farmers' characteristics, but also by the type of buyer and the financial 
situation of the farmers or their organisation. 
Keywords: Cashew nuts value chain; Markup; Rents sharing; Benin; Globalization. 
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I-  General context, motivation and research question 
Globalization through its corollary of market integration and economic interdependence 
has led to a restructuring of international trade. A reorganization is observed through the 
increase of norms and standards for agricultural products (Maertens and Swinnen, 
2015). And it is not without consequences for small producers in developing countries 
characterized by the poverty of their populations. Developing countries care about the 
income generated by agricultural trade (through export crops), which is one of the main 
sources of their exports revenues. Agriculture plays an important role in developing 
countries’ poverty reduction (Christiaensen et al., 2011). In Benin, an emphasis is 
placed on the diversification of export crops in the strategic development orientations 
(IMF, 2011; MAEP, 2017).  In fact, increasing the earnings of smallholders (who live 
in rural areas) in trade could have desirable effects on poverty reduction in the countries 
concerned. It may therefore be important to understand the earnings of smallholders 
involved in export crops in developing countries. What are their gains in international 
trade? What are their shares of the sale revenues from the marketing of the products 
involved? 
Several studies have dealt with the subject of the effects of globalization on the poorest 
or on small producers. These studies (e.g. Minten et al., 2007, and Harrison, 2006) have 
generally focused on the capacities of small producers to integrate in the international 
market. From these studies, it appears that the imposition of standards and norms as well 
as contracts in trade could be a source of inclusion or exclusion of small producers from 
international trade. For instance, Houssa and Verpoorten (2015) show that a ban on 
shrimp exports due to the inability of Benin's shrimp sector to conform to European 
standards had a negative impact on producers even after the ban was lifted. Another 
important question is the benefit/profit small producers obtain from their participations 
in international trade in which a strong vertical structure of value chains exists. In this 
context of vertical structure, small producers located at the bottom of the scale face 
exporters or retailers who could benefit more from trade. This raises the problem of 
bargaining power and share in the gains from the sale of agricultural products (Richard, 
2012; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018). On this subject, the conclusions are that market 
power is influenced by the characteristics of producers (in terms of capacities of 
investment in the production process) who react differently to the advantages of 
globalisation.  
Analysing the participation of small producers of developing countries in international 
trade is not an easy task. These producers do not operate directly on the international 
market: their participations take place through intermediaries and exporters who buy 
their products on the domestic markets. In fact, it is these intermediaries and/or exporters 
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who are supposed to know the product standards required by the demand side and the 
collection points of supply side on the domestic markets. This leads us to focus on the 
interactions between small producers and buyers on the domestic markets to identify the 
determinants of small farmers' market power. We would like to contribute to this 
literature by analysing the specific case of small producers in the cashew value-chain in 
Benin. In terms of production levels, Benin accounts for 3.5% of worldwide cashew nuts 
production (Ricau, 2013) and exports in cashew are estimated at about 95% of domestic 
total production of cashew (Allagbé et al, 2014). Cashew nut is Benin's second largest 
export product in 2018, accounting for 15.66% (after cotton accounting for 54.78% and 
before oleaginous seeds and fruits accounting for 4.36%) of the total value of exported 
products (INSAE, 2019).  The cashew sector accounts for around 200,000 producers 
(MAEP, 2017). The importance of cashew nuts as a potential source of income for the 
country would justify the fixing of selling prices by the State in each marketing year. 
The cashew nut sector is also included in the government's agricultural recovery plan. 
However, the price set is not the one systematically applied in field sales. In the 2019 
marketing year, for instance (graphs 4 and 5), more than 80% of producers in our survey 
area (Atacora-Donga) sold their cashew at a lower price than the fixed price of 400 F 
CFA. 
This study characterizes cashew transactions between producers and a range of buyers 
in Benin’s domestic cashew markets.  It distinguishes four types of buyers:  i) local 
market, ii) national private, iii) foreign private, and iv) the cashew producers’ union.  
From the producer side, we identify two possibilities: either the producer sells 
individually its production; or a group of producers sell together. We address the 
following research questions: What are the determinants of farmer’s markup in the 
cashew value chain in Benin? To which extent the producer has some market power?   
Using the ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data on 261 cashew nuts producers, we 
follow the work of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker and Eeckhout 
(2017) and proceed in three steps. First, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production 
function in order to capture the elasticity of the variable inputs at the cashew nuts 
sectoral level. It emerges that variable inputs are the most important inputs for cashew 
nuts cultivation in the study region. Also, the use of improved seed helps to increase 
production. However, we find that having a right/proof to use the plot lower the 
production. Second, we determine the markup for each farmer as the ratio between the 
elasticity of variable inputs and the share of the value of variable inputs in the total 
value of the farmer's sales as defined by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Third, we 
regress the markup on the characteristics related to the farmers, production, buyers, 
selling, finance and training in order to analyse theirs effects.  
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The results show that variable inputs decrease the markup when spending on fixed 
inputs allows the farmer to have a higher markup. This shows that the markup makes it 
possible to identify the farmer's level of technology (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018). 
Compare to male, female farmers doing better with positive effect on the markup. 
Concerning buyers there are heterogeneous results as union has negative effective on 
farmer’s markup compare to local market for which the effect is positive. Also, we 
observe that the existence of outstanding loan has a negative effect on the farmer’s 
markup. But this negative effect of loan could be mitigated by the positive effect 
observe when the farmer’s PO is financed by the project PROFI. We suspect an effect 
of the internal governance of the PO to which the farmer belongs on the level of his 
markup. In POs with individual sales, there is a positive effect on the markup. 
Compared to the period before the marketing period, selling nuts during the marketing 
period has a positive effect on the markup. Indeed, the regulatory price fixed by the 
government during the marketing period helps farmers to sell at a higher price (by 
increasing their bargaining power) than before the marketing period. 
The rest of the thesis is organized into the following sections. A literature review on 
market power in the globalization context for the small producers and how to measure 
the market power through the estimation of markup is discussed in Section II. A 
background on the cashew value chain in Benin is presented in Section III. Section IV 
deals with the methodology including the data used, some descriptive statistics and the 
model used. Section V discussed empirical results. The last section concludes. 
 
II- Literature review 
In this section, we discuss the implications of globalization on the possible benefits or 
disadvantages for smallholders. We also show how the literature addressed the question 
of market power determinants, how market power is measured and its implications. 
1- Globalization and causes of imperfect markets (presence of market power 
or misallocation of the trade revenues) 
“Globalization is the growing integration of economies and societies around the world. 
This integration is the result of reduced cost of transport, lower trade barriers, faster 
communication of ideas, rising capital flows, and intensifying pressure for migration” 
(Collier and Dollar, 2001, p.1). The increase in trade resulting from globalization is 
leading to an interdependence of economies and a more competitive market through the 
removal of several barriers to international trade (Ceko, 2013). It is then expected that 
the marketing of agricultural products, for example by producers, can be done at least at 
an equilibrium price (price equals to the marginal cost of the producer).  However, 
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“globalization implies both winners and losers among the different actors between and 
within countries” (Collier and Dollar, 2001, p.1). Although globalization encourages 
free trade (Collier and Dollar, 2001), there is an increase in standards of the 
characteristics of agricultural products traded on the international market (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2014). These quality and safety standards can lead to non-tariff barriers to 
global trade and make more difficulty participation into international trade with 
agricultural products for developing countries (Maertens and Swinnen, 2014). Also, 
globalization has promoted vertical coordination in value chains that may exclude 
smallholders from the international trade. As matter of fact, “Vertical coordination refers 
to the synchronization of the successive stages of a production and marketing system. 
Methods of vertical coordination include open markets, often referred to as spot markets, 
contracts, and vertical integration” (Martinez, 2002, p.1). 
Vertical coordination can have important advantages for small producers. It facilitates 
small producers in international trade through improved marketing (Harrigan, 1985). 
Indeed, vertical coordination could lead to further market opening through the sharing 
of information on product characteristics that solves the issue of information asymmetry. 
This could then increase the circulation of products on the market, the benefits for 
smallholders and their market power. Minten et al. (2007) in their attempt to show the 
impact of trade on the environment through small producers of vegetable in Madagascar 
find that standards simplify the integration of small producers into the value chains. 
Indeed, the increase in standards has allowed small producers to have contracts with 
Madagascar's largest vegetable exporters. Through these contracts, producers have 
received training on the use of compost to preserve the environment and comply with 
international trade standards. The results show an improvement in the productivity of 
both vegetable products and rice (which is grown during periods when vegetable 
products are not produced) and in soil fertility and the protection of the environment. 
This then facilitates poverty reduction through the increase and stability of their 
incomes. However, the authors remain cautious about generalization in Madagascar as 
opposite results have been observed for maize exporters in the southwest of the country. 
Murthy (2011) also conducted a study on the consequences of vertical integration 
resulting from the increase in norms and standards on exported products. This study 
involved 86 cotton producers in India. The results show a significant increase in 
productivity and income among producers with respect to integration. 
Vertical integration can also present significant constraints that could weaken the market 
power of small producers. The definition of agricultural product norms and standards 
for consumer satisfaction violates competitive market assumptions by leading to 
possible dissimilarities among products. In fact, to be a competitive market, where 
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buyers and sellers are price takers, the market must meet three conditions (Sexton, 
2012):  
- Buyer and seller must be each very small regarding the total size of the market 
so that no one could influence the price. 
- The products of all sellers must be homogeneous in the eyes of buyers.  
-  Information in the marketplace must be perfect, so that all buyers and sellers are 
aware of the prices being charged and the characteristics of the products being 
sold. 
But due to the presence of norms and standards concerning the export products, one 
observes an imperfect market case. Also, globalization has promoted vertical 
coordination in value chains that may exclude or disadvantage smallholders because of 
the presence of buyers whose obtain most of the gains from trade (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2014). This could be explained by the fact that exporters or buyers are the 
ones who have all the information (norms and standards) on demand and know where 
to buy the products. As small producers do not have sufficient market information, 
buyers benefit from this by receiving high transaction costs. This contributes to 
weakening the market power of producers by selling products at low prices. Loecker 
and Eeckhout (2018), however, found that the presence of market power is due to the 
heterogeneity of the producers/firms. This heterogeneity might stem from disparities 
cost between firms. But the results of Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout could be a 
consequence of the presence of standards. Indeed, the increase in standards resulting 
from demand incurs new investment costs as technology matters (e.g: acquisition of 
capital and proficiency in production techniques). But they are unable to invest because 
of their small size and low-income level (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2011). In that case, 
either they are excluded from the market or forced to sell at a lower price than what 
would be possible with a more productive/more advanced technology. 
2- Market restructuration and rent sharing 
According to Sexton (2012) the market power of buyers which are intermediaries 
between farmers and consumers is harmful for the agricultural sector by damping 
famers’ incentives to invest. This argument is based on the studies of Huang and Sexton 
(1996) and Alston et al. (1997). These studies show that intermediaries with market 
power can capture a large share of the benefits from the supply shift induced by farm 
sector research or adoption of new technology. Furthermore, Sexton (2012) extends the 
analysis to consumer and producer surplus by showing graphically that the presence of 
retailers/intermediaries who have market power generate concomitant reductions in both 
consumer and producer surplus. Market intermediaries can thus capture large shares of 
the benefits from policies intended to benefit farmers. It is therefore necessary to 
introduce a regulatory policy (e.g. setting a minimum price) with the objective of 
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improving welfare of small scaled actors. Russo et al. (2011), showed that setting a 
minimum agricultural price constrains buyers from exercising their market power in an 
oligopsony situation. 
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) in their study about macroeconomic implications of 
the rise of market power affirm that: 
“The presence of market power has implications for welfare and resource 
allocation. Firms that can command a price above marginal cost produce less 
output. In addition to lowering consumer welfare, this has implications for factor 
demand, for the distribution of economic rents, and for business dynamics such 
as entry and exit, and resource allocation.” (p.2)  
However, some studies (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Minten et al, 2007; Swinnen and 
Vandeplas, 2010) shown that farmers can take advantage in the rents sharing through 
contract enforcement. Contract is a way for small farmers in developing countries 
precisely in Africa to integrate export markets and generate more income. This is 
making it possible by providing new technology and secured inputs and prices (Kirsten 
and Sartorius, 2002). The distribution of rents in supply chain in developing countries 
are mostly linked to factors market constraints and weak institutions to enforce formal 
contracts between agents. Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) argue that farmers are 
engaging in complex contracts with buyers. The contracts define not only the quantity 
and quality of the products to be delivered by the farmers, but also the supply of inputs, 
credits...by the buyers. These contracts according to Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) lead 
to improve the welfare of both buyers and famers through improvement of quality of 
products. The question arising from this situation is who really benefits from this 
improvement in the well-being of the agents involved: one or both? 
Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) try to respond to the question by studying the impact of 
concentration in global food chains on efficiency and rents distribution. For this they 
develop a model which explicitly considers market imperfections and contract 
enforcement problems in supply chains. As results, they find complex interactions 
between concentration and rents distribution which can be resumed as follow: 
“The growth of global food chains affects farmers in developing countries by 
increasing market opportunities for them. Moreover, in the presence of market 
imperfections and contract enforcement problems, efficiency premiums in 
vertically coordinated contract arrangements may provide additional benefits for 
farmers. Increased competition is likely to benefit farms by improving contract 
conditions but may hurt them as contract enforcement becomes more 
complicated. The empirical literature provides substantial evidence that contract 
terms indeed improve with more competition, but also that input and credit 
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programs have collapsed because of (too much) competition and opportunistic 
behavior by farmers.” (p.10) 
This is consistent with Minten et al (2007) who show that smallholder vegetable 
producers in Madagascar benefit from trade despite selling products to monopolistic 
export companies. This has been possible through improvements in productivity, 
product quality, soil fertility and environmental protection. So, we can see that, 
restructuration of agricultural export markets leads to some market power which could 
have both negative and positive effects on rent sharing for famers. 
3- Estimating the market power 
Based on how companies compete White (2012) defines a method for measuring the 
market power. Its analysis is based on the competitive market assumption and defines 
the market power as the ability for a firm to have discretion over the price that it charges. 
Under this perfect competition, any producer should sell its production at a price equal 
to its marginal cost. This implies not having any market power. In other word, market 
power is the difference between sell’s price and marginal cost, relative to sell’s price 
and called “Lener index”.  Mathematically, the market power indicator represented by 





with L = Indicator of market power, P = price and MC = marginal cost 
When L >/< 0 we have an imperfect market (the agents have a certain level of power). 
But in real world, markets are not competitive. This situation is described by Robinson 
(1933) and Chamberlin (1933) as "imperfect competition" and "monopolistic 
competition" respectively. They find that the equilibrium is achieved with an easy entry 
on the market of firms which has close characteristics. And at the equilibrium we have 
the following expression (2) which implies that there is always market power. Indeed, 
the price set is different from the marginal cost. 
𝑃 = 𝐴𝐶 > 𝑀𝐶 (2), 
with P = price, AC = average cost and MC = marginal cost 
The implementation of the Lener index expression provided by White (2012), is not easy 
to measure market power. First, the market power is computed in terms of profit rate 
and marginal costs are not directly observable in the data. Second, White based his work 
on the so-called demand approach which needs to have a detailed micro-level data on 
products, prices, consumers, and firms. 
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In contrast, for De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) market power is typically measured 
by the markup. The approach adopted by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) is the so-
called production approach as opposed to the demand approach. The demand approach 
estimates markup based on profit maximisation and requires a knowledge of marginal 
costs and data on demand (in terms of price, quantity, consumer characteristics, etc.), 
which is almost impossible to obtain. The so-called production approach does not 
require demand modelling and is based instead on producer income data. In addition, 
the cost minimisation method makes it possible to assess the change in the markup due 
to the change in inputs involving the technology used. 
In their study to examine how the change in the environment of the firm could affect the 
markup (through the relationship between markups and export behaviour), De Loecker 
and Warzynski  (2012)  give a method to estimate markup using panel production data 
from Slovenian firms over the period 1994-2000. Based on the microeconomic equation 




      (3), 
with   μ = the markup; 𝜃𝑋= the output elasticity of variable input X and 𝛼𝑋= the share 
of expenditures on variable input X in total sales.  
Using the production functions with a scalar Hicks-neutral productivity term and with 
common technology parameters across the set of producers, they derive the output 
elasticity of variable inputs. They find that: 
“markups differ dramatically between exporters and non-exporters and are both 
statistically and economically significantly higher for exporting firms.” (p.5) 
Thus, markup depend on the characteristics of firms. Indeed, De Loecker and Warzynski 
(2012) show that these differences in markup between exporters and non-exporters 
would be explained by the quality of the products and the better productivity of the 
exporters. The most productive firms are those that have an easier ability to penetrate 
the export market and earn more margin from the market. The weakness of this method 
is that the estimated markup can be affected. However, this in no way affects the 
correlation between the markup and the characteristics of the firm. 
Using the same so-called production approach as De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), 
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) highlight the difference between markup and the profit 
margin in their study of the macroeconomic implications of market provisioning. This 
study focuses on the evolution of the markups of publicly traded firms covering all 
sectors of the US economy from 1950 to 2014 to illustrate the effects of market power 
on the US economy. Using an industry-specific Cobb-Douglas production function they 
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derive the same expression of markup (expression 3) as De Loecker and Warzynski 
(2012). And present markup as proxy of market power and stressed that an increase in 
the markup does not always imply market power if profit rate is used as indicator of 
market power as in White (2012). De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) try to explain their 
idea as follows:  
“Markups tell us that the margin of revenue over variable costs has increased. 
That does not necessarily imply that firms are making higher profits. If for 
example the source of the increase in markups is technological change that 
reduces variable costs, and the same technological change increases the fixed 
costs. […] As a result, profits will continue to be low and higher markups do not 
imply higher market power.”  
Through a response note to the criticisms received on the 2017 article, De Loecker and 
Eeckhout (2018) emphasize this difference to show that markup gives more information 
than the profit rate. The markup allows to identify the role of technology (through 
variable costs) in market power. 
 
III- BACKGROUND ON THE CASHEW SECTOR IN BENIN 
The cashew tree is a crop native from South America that was introduced in Benin in 
the 17th century as a pleasure plant and to fix the dunes. Cashew were planted in the 
1960s for reforestation purpose by the public administration (state water and forestry 
services) before being bequeathed, in 1976, to local communities due to management 
constraints (Aïvodji and Anasside, 2009; Soglo and Assogba, 2009). It was during the 
period 1976-1990, that the cashew nut served as a fruit tree providing income 
opportunities for the planters (Aïvodji and Anasside, 2009). 
The sector developed rapidly from the 1990s onwards. Tandjiekpon (2010) cites as 
reasons for this importance the rise in the purchase price of nuts on the international 
market, the need for diversification following the difficulties of cotton and the 
devaluation of the CFA franc, making local production more competitive. 
From 1990 onwards, the area under cultivation, about 10,000 ha, increased rapidly 
(Lacroix, 2003) to be estimated at about 200,000 ha in 2017 (MAEP, 2017). However, 
the sector records low yields in the order of 150 to 350 kg/ha of raw nuts (MAEP, 2017). 
Compared to other West African countries, Benin has the lowest yield over the two 
decades from 1998 to 2018, as shown in graph 1 below. According to the MAEP (2017), 
the government projected an increase in these yields to reach the target of 600 kg/ha in 
2021. 
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Graph 1: Cashew nuts yield in West Africa (kg/ha) in the period 1998-2018 
Source: by author based on FAO data from http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC 
The low yields could be attributed to poor cultivation practices, lack of seed and 
plantation maintenance (Tandjiekpon, 2010; MAEP, 2017). In addition to these 
arguments, Soglo and Assogba (2009) point out the lack of financing and the fact that 
there is no quality requirement when the government sets minimum prices, as causes of 
the low returns observed. Despite the low yields noted in the sector, cashew nuts 
constitute one of the country's main sources of income. Indeed, the cashew sector is 
currently Benin's second largest source of export revenue, accounting for about 15.66% 
of the value of exports, with an estimated 200,000 producers (INSAE, 2019). In 
addition, the quantity of cashew nuts exported increased significantly - by 156% - from 
2011 to 2015 (MAEP, 2017). Benin has a comparative advantage in cashew nut 
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production, which is highly recognized on the international market a KOR1  between 47 
and 52 libs. As a result of this advantage, Benin ranks eighth in the world in cashew nut 
production in terms of quantity (Akomagni, 2017). This importance leads the state to 
regulate the sector by setting a floor price for cashew nuts for each marketing year. 
Setting a minimum price is a mechanism that has existed since colonial times in African 
colonies (including Benin). It is used to reduce the impact of the volatility of world 
prices of tropical export products and would also allow producers to cover the variable 
costs of production. Soglo and Assogba (2009) point out the problem of storage as a 
constraint for the sector. They argue that farmers do not master/respect storage 
techniques. The government, with the aim of boosting the sector, has implemented 
several reforms. In 2000, the sector was instituted as a value chain with a pricing 
mechanism bringing together the different actors (Lacroix, 2003). The purchase price of 
cashew nuts is set by the government after negotiations with producers, buyers, 
exporters and state structures. Tandjiekpon (2010) reports that the fixed price is never 
applied, the sale being made at a price 25% below the minimum price. In fact, producers 
often sign pre-harvest agreements with buyers. These contracts help farmers to receive 
credits (in the form of advance) to deal with production (paying for inputs and labour) 
and social problems (Soglo and Assogba, 2009; Swinnen et al., 2013). Also, the weak 
sales organization combined with the few number of buyers allow buyers to act as price 
makers (Soglo and Assogba, 2009; Tandjiekpon, 2010). 
With the same objective of boosting the value chain, an inter-professional organisation 
for the cashew sector (IFA) was created in June 2016. The IFA is responsible for 
proposing a minimum price for raw cashew nuts each year, but it is the government that 
finally decides on this price in the Council of Ministers after analysing the initial IFA 
proposal and taking into account other considerations. The government's pricing 
mechanism for each season is not based on a clear methodology. There is no evidence 
that it incorporates data for each stage of the production chain (MAEP, 2017). This could 
prevent producers from benefiting from their activities because they do not obtain 
income favourable to the expansion of their activities. As a result, they will not be able 
to acquire better production technologies in order to reduce the production cost and to 
benefit more from their activity. 
Through graph 2, we observe the evolution between the minimum prices fixed by the 
government and the export prices per kilogram in 2000-2018. Over the entire period, the 
export price remains well above the minimum price. Intermediaries seem to be those 
 
1 The KOR (Kernel Output Ratio) measures the quality of cashew. It is measured in lbs quality in terms of one bag of 80 kg 
of raw cashew nuts. An excellent out turn is 48 – 55 lbs. A good out-turn is 43 – 48 lbs. Less than 43 lbs is a poor grade and 
is usually rejected. (Tandjiekpon, 2010) 
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who benefit from the chain since the producers already sell at a price below the 
minimum set as shown later on graphs 3, 4 and 5.  This confirms Sexton (2012) who 
finds that intermediaries are harmful to the agricultural sector. But the differences 
observed between export and producer prices could be explained by transport and 
storage costs and taxes paid by exporters as well as production cost of processors. 
Graph 2: Evolution of the export price and the regulation price of cashew nuts from 2000 to 2018 
 
So, it is important to support producers to facilitate access to new technologies and 
increase their bargaining power. In fact, producers are pre financed by buyers to access 
inputs, labor and technical assistances (Swinnen and al., 2013; Tandjiekpon, 2010) 
before the marketing period; which limits their bargaining power. An improvement in 
the producers' share of cashew nut marketing revenues could have a positive effect on 
household welfare in terms of income by the value chain. 
Cashew nuts are cultivated in several communes of Benin classified in three zones by 
MAEP (2017). The very favourable zone composed of 17 communes and represent 87% 
of the plantations in Benin, the favourable zone concerns 14 communes and includes 
11% of the plantations and the fairly favourable zone composed of 09 communes has 
2% of the plantations. Figure 1 below shows the different zones. 


















Source: By author based on data from Ministerial Council Orders and INSAE data
Export and regulation price of cashew in Bénin(2000-2018)
Regulation_price Export_price
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Figure 1: Cashew nuts production area in Benin 
Benin has generally three production seasons: a great rainy season (form March to June), 
a little rainy season (from July to October) and a dry season (from November to 
February). But the north of the country which includes the region studied (Atacora-
Donga) is characterized by two main production seasons: a rainy season (from March to 
August) and a dry season (from September to February). Cashew marketing officially 
begins in March and continues until September.  And sales reach their peak during the 
month of May. Harvests already start during the dry season from December to reach 
their peak in February and last until April (the period December-February is called pre-
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campaign). It should be noted that some producers do not await the beginning of the 
marketing period to sell their products and a significant part of the trade is outside 
official control. Akomagni (2017) reports that: 
“The sale of nuts is done in houses, roadsides, in buyers' shops or those of 
producer groups. Markets are organized spontaneously according to the actors 
(producers, traders, exporters). They take place outside the formal market places 
and days.  Home selling is the dominant mode (statistics from our survey). The 
advantage of this sales mode is that it allows producers to limit the transport 
costs linked to the marketing of the product.” (p.36) 
Akomagni (2017), explains this fact by the financial difficulties faced by producers. 
The main actors interacting to purchase the products harvested during marketing process 
are highlighted in the figure 2 below. We have:  
i) Collectors (also call locally pisteur/demarcheur/revendeur): more informal, 
they live in the production areas and have an excellent geographical 
knowledge of the production sites. They have the possibility to work for 
several wholesalers who provide them with working capital. However, they 
can also operate with their own funds, which gives them the opportunity to 
sell to processors for instance. We assume here that they correspond to the 
local market. By local market, we mean the case where the producer cannot 
identify the true buyer because he has sold the cashew either at home or at a 
market without any planning.  
ii) Wholesalers: generally formalized, they correspond in our study to national 
and foreign private buyers, they have a contractual relationship with exporters 
and operate in the field with the help of collectors. There are about twenty 
wholesalers on the marketing system and each wholesaler may have between 
30 and 40 collectors in its network. A wholesaler can buy directly from 
producers through its field agents. They would benefit from campaign credits 
from the exporters. Some of them, however, start purchasing with their own 
funds, which allows them to have some independence and sell the products to 
the exporter with the highest offer. 
iii) Farmers’ Union: they are also wholesalers/semi-wholesalers but with the 
difference that they buy directly from producers. So, in addition to selling to 
exporters and wholesalers they also sell to processing units. 
iv) Exporters: they are generally formalized with documents proving their 
exporter status. We have few exporters on the market (around 06), they buy 
the nuts from wholesalers. 
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Figure 2: Actors interacting during cashew nut marketing process in Benin 
 
 Source: by author with aggregating informations form: Akomagni (2017), MAEP (2017), Soglo and Assogba (2009) and 
Tandjiekpon (2010) 
In summary, despite the evolution and the importance of cashew nuts in Benin, this 
sector is characterized by a low production yield due to the lack of mastery of production 
techniques, the lack of maintenance of plantations and the lack of seed and the storage 
techniques. Its development is also constrained by a weak price setting and enforcement 
mechanism, a low local processing rate and a strong dominance of intermediaries. 
 
IV- METHODOLOGY 
First, we present data used and descriptive statistics. Second, we present the model used 
to estimate markup and the determinants of market power (measured as markup).  
1- Data 
The data used are collected by the BeFinD-Academic Research Organisation for Policy 
Support (ACROPOLIS) in collaboration with the Belgian Development Agency 
(ENABEL) in the Atacora-Donga region in the framework of the PROFI’s program 
(PROgramme d'appui aux FIlières agricoles).  
In 2016 and 2017, ENABEL launched, respectively, two calls for micro-projects for 
production and marketing (MIC) whose target for intervention is the producers’ 
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organization (PO).  And three agricultural sectors were targeted (cashew nuts; rice; and 
vegetable products) to benefit from financial and non-financial support in the Mono-
Couffo region in the south and Atacora-Donga in northern Benin. After this 
identification phase, POs submitted their MIC project ideas. ENABEL analysed them 
through a selection process in three successive and qualifying stages: pre-selection; field 
visits; and final selection of projects by a regional approval committee (CRA). Table 1 
below summarizes the selection process for micro-projects in the cashew nut sector. 
Table 1: Number of cashew nut POs selected 
Cashew 
CRA 1 CRA 2 
Total 
Number of POs % Number of POs % 
Application process 54  45  99 
Selection process      
Pre-selection 48 89 35 78 83 
Field visits 30 63 11 31 41 
Final CRA 27 90 10 91 37 
Financed 27 100 6 60 33 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
Data were collected on 5 producers in each of the POs selected during the CRA sessions 
(financed or not). The data covered 3 production seasons, which are:  
• rainy season of the 2018-2019 production campaign: March 2018 to August 
2018; 
• dry season of the 2018-2019 production campaign: September 2018 to 
February 2019;  
• rainy season of the 2019-2020 production campaign: March 2019 to August 
2019. 
A total of 215 cashew nut producers were initially scheduled to be interviewed. But 
during the data collection, producers initially targeted in rice and vegetable POs were 
identified as cashew nut producers as well. This brought the number of cashew nut 
respondents to 261. Table 2 shows the distribution of producers over commune with 
Kouandé, Péhunco, Bassila, Djougou and Ouaké as the most represented. This makes 
sense as the most represented communes are classified among the very favourable zone 
for cashew nut production in contrast (MAEP, 2017) 
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Table 2: Number of cashew nut producers by commune 
Department Commune Freq. Percent 
Atacora 
Kérou 15 5.75 
Kouandé 27 10.34 
Natitingou 3 1.15 
Péhunco 43 16.48 
Toucountouna 15 5.75 
Donga 
Bassila 38 14.56 
Copargo 20 7.66 
Djougou 64 24.52 
Ouaké 36 13.79 
Total 261 100.00 
               Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
The possibility was given to record data on the three most important plots belonging to 
each respondent. There are three possible modes of exploitation of a plot as illustrated 
in figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: Agricultural plot types 
Source: Calderone et al. (2018) 
Common mode: The respondent uses the parcel directly together with all other 
members of the PO. All expenses and revenues are shared indiscriminately among the 
different members. 
Shared mode: The plot is in bloc with those of the other members of the PO and each 
member has a part that is operated by his household (or team). Each member is 
responsible for his or her part of the land in terms of expenses and income even if some 
decisions can be made in common in the PO. 
Individual mode: The plots are not in one block: each one has its plot clearly detached 
from those of the others. The respondent is completely autonomous in terms of decisions 
to be taken for production. 
Advanced Master in International and Development Economics 
Personal Project – EDEVM350 
 
  
Sourou Marius OLODO 18 
 
Table 3 shows how the plots of land used in the case of cashew nut are exploited. The 
individual farm type is the most dominant for cashew plots.  This would be explained by 
the fact that on average 85% of the plots are obtained by inheritance (statistics from the 
study data).  
Table 3: Distribution of mode of plot exploitation 
Type of plot 
Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 
observation % observation % observation % 
Common 5 2.76 0 0 0 0 
Shared 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Individual 176 97.24 117 100 48 100 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
The figure 4 below shows the distribution of the producers for each harvesting season, 
and the regulation price for each marketing period. It should be noted that the most 
observed harvest period is the dry season, with 245 respondents compared to 16 in the 
2018 rainy season and 14 in the 2019 rainy season. In fact, nuts mature at different times 
depending on the location (Evin, 2000). Most farmers are already harvesting during the 
dry season (between December and February), according to the communes. However, 
other farmers in other communes start harvesting nuts two or three months after the dry 
season. 
Figure 4: Distribution of producers over harvesting and marketing period 
Source: by author based on Minister council order and ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
a- Production performance 
Table 4 shows that the communes of Kerou, Kouandé, Péhunco, Bassila and Djougou 
are the largest in terms of exploited areas and production levels. These communes are 
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in the very favourable zone of production except for Kérou which is located in the fairy 
favourable zone (MAEP, 2017). 
However, yield data show communes such as Toucountouna (427 kg/ha) and Copargo 
(484 kg/ha) as the most important, although not among the most important in terms of 
area and production level. They are followed by Kouandé (426 kg/ha) and Djougou (386 
kg/ha).  Except for the commune of Toucountouna, all are located in the very favourable 
production area. The location of the plot (the farming commune) is therefore expected 
to not have some effect on the respondents' performance. This will also be analyzed 
from the gain (margin) obtained from the sale of products in Table 8 later in this section. 
With the exception of Natitingou and Basilla, the yields obtained are well above the 
national average (303.51 kg/ha) observed over the decade 2008-2018 highlighted in 
graph 1 with data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO). 
Table 4: Production by commune 
Department Commune 
Cultivated area  Quantity produced 
Yield (Kg/Ha) 
Ha % Kg % 
Atacora 
Kérou 170 15.18 52768 15.07 340 
Kouandé 123 10.98 43601 12.46 426 
Natitingou 9 0.80 1200 0.34 238 
Péhunco 201 17.95 65213 18.63 343 
Toucountouna 67 5.98 22000 6.28 427 
Donga 
Bassila 222 19.82 48254 13.78 268 
Copargo 73 6.52 30695 8.77 484 
Djougou 206 18.39 72167 20.62 386 
Ouaké 49 4.38 14153 4.04 344 
Total 1120 100 350051 100   
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
Because the way the decisions are taken in the PO could influence the performance of 
farmers, we build the table 5 based on the type of decision (individual or collective) in 
the PO. Three types of decisions have been considered here: the choice of crop to 
produce, the inputs to be purchased and the commercialisation of the agricultural 
production. The PO organization is considered as individual if the average score 
obtained for all 3 decisions is higher in terms of individual decisions than collective 
decisions.  
For each of the 3 plots the individual type is the most dominant. However, for the plot 
submitted for funding for PROFI (plot 1), the collective organization is also important 
Advanced Master in International and Development Economics 
Personal Project – EDEVM350 
 
  
Sourou Marius OLODO 20 
 
(40. 17%). The individual mode is very characteristic of the cashew nut sector and this 
could be linked to the mode of acquisition of plots that are predominantly inherited. The 
importance of the collective organization observed for the plot submitted for financing 
can be explained by the requirements of the project. Indeed, the project was more 
oriented towards POs with a collective organisation. 
Table 5: Organization of production and commercialisation 
Plot type 
Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 
Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent 
Individual 137 59.83 214 95.96 148 98.01 
Collective 92 40.17 9 4.04 3 1.99 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
Through Table 6, which relates the type of PO organization (individual or collective) to 
producer performance in terms of yield, one is tempted to say that there is no effect of 
PO organization on producer performance. Indeed, no trend emerges from the 
observation of average and median yields for each of the plots. However, the large 
variance observed suggests huge imprecision/heterogeneities.  
Table 6: Yield by type of PO organization 
 Yield (kg/ha) 
Type of PO organization 
sd min mean median max 
Plot 1 
Individual 160.11 62.5 350.18 333.33 1000 
Collective 207.24 20 310.05 267.33 1100 
  Plot 2 
Individual 199.31 25 353.04 321.25 971.43 
Collective 132.71 266.67 431.78 422 600 
  Plot 3 
Individual 210.43 62.5 364.24 375 1000 
Collective . . . . . 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
b- Price, cost and margin from sales 
Graphs 3, 4 and 5 below highlight the proportion of respondents for whom cashew nut 
selling prices deviate from the minimum recommended by the government.  It appears 
that about 82% of the respondents who harvested during the 2018 rainy season and 
participated in the 2018 marketing year sold their production at a price higher than the 
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indicated minimum of 650 CFAF (Graph 3). However, about 80% of those who 
harvested in the dry season (Graph 4) and 100% of those who harvested in the 2019 
rainy season (Graph 5) to participate in the 2019 marketing year sold their production at 
a price below the minimum of 400 CFA francs. This information shows that the 
minimum price indicated by the government is not always the reference in the field. This 
weakens the welfare of producers who earn low incomes from their activities compared 
to the price of selling on the international market.  
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Graph 4: Deviation from the 2019 regulation price for producers who harvested during the dry 
season 
 
Graph 5: Deviation from the 2019 regulation price for producers who harvested during the rainy 
season 2019 
 
Comparing the rainy period (2018 and 2019), it can be observed that the producers2 
earned higher revenues during the 2018 marketing year (where regulation price was 650 
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F CFA) than during the 2019 sales year (where regulation price was 400 F CFA). This 
is confirmed when we consider the median parameters (selling price and quantity sold) 
in 2019 (1143 kg and 280.612 F CFA/kg) and in 2018 (673 kg and 750 FCFA/kg). 
Similarly, producers who harvested their produce in the dry season and participated in 
the 2019 sale also sold their produce at relatively low prices compared to those of the 
2018 marketing year.  
Table 7 below, gives the minimum and maximum marketing prices as well as the 
average and median prices by harvest season and marketing period. The results are 
consistent with the observations made in graphs 3, 4 and 5. Indeed, the average and 
median selling prices are higher for those who participated in the 2018 marketing year, 
during which the price set by the government was 650 F CFA, compared to the 2019 
marketing year, when the price set was 400 F CFA. 
Table 7: Selling price and quantity sold over season 
Harvest season 
Selling price (F CFA) 
Minimum Mean Median Maximum 
Rainy season 2018 183.33 656.94 750 836.81 
Dry season 2018 129.17 314.66 300 888.89 
Rainy season 2019 200 288.74 280.61 398 
Harvest season 
Quantity sold (kg) 
Minimum Mean Median Maximum 
Rainy season 2018 200 1559.44 673 4500 
Dry season 2018 37 1153.34 800 6000 
Rainy season 2019 300 1688.5 1143 4177 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
So even if, as shown in graphs 3, 4 and 5, the regulatory price set by the government is 
not systematically applied during sales, it could nevertheless be suspected that it has an 
effect on the prices applied during cashew nut sales operations. It could be interpreted 
as a signal from the government. Following an increase in the regulation price, the 
exchange price on the market would increase (and conversely for a decrease in the 
regulation price).                                                                                                                         
In general graph 6 shows that unit costs of production and unit margins/losses are 
relatively low and constant between the different producers observed regardless of the 
period of production. Those with very high unit costs of production are identified as 
those with the lowest margins so that the unit loss recorded is equal to the unit cost. 
These growers may have cashew seedlings on their plots so that they have not made a 
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sale. Although the unit margins observed are relatively consistent between producers, it 
also appears that half of the margins are negative. These observations would be 
explained by the conclusions drawn in Section III on the background of the cashew nut 
production chain in Benin. The sector is characterized by a lack of investment by 
producers. This has resulted in low production costs that affect yields and quality in a 
way that reduces possible margins.  
What about the extent of the margin for those that are positive? Assuming cashew nut 
cultivation as the only source of income, could the representative producer satisfy his 
primary or subsistence needs? Even if the margin obtained from the sale is positive, it 
would not allow the representative producer (median) to be self-supporting. In fact, in 
the dry season, when we have the most harvest, the representative producer would obtain 
a margin of 177.300 F CFA francs per kg for a quantity sold of  800 kg (table 7), thus a 
total income of about 141,840 CFA francs for a year (around 394 FCFA/day or 
$0.739/day). This does not allow the smallholders to cross the poverty line of $1.90 per 
day (World Bank, 2016) defined for Benin. This supports the hypothesis that cashew 
nut producers are disadvantaged in the marketing of their products by the low profits 
they make. 
Graph 6: Distribution of Margin after sales, Selling price and Production cost 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
The observation in Table 8 showing the profit margins obtained by producers after sales 
supports the hypothesis of the non-existence of a "location effect" on producers' 
performance. Indeed, it can be seen that (considering the median margins) producers in 
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the communes of Kérou, Natitingou, Toucountouna, Copargo and Djougou had the 
highest profit margins. In particular, the producers in the commune of Natitingou are 
those who would record the highest margin (373 CFA francs as the median margin) 
despite the fact that they are not among the best performers both in terms of production 
level and yield. These differences in performance could then be attributed to a lack of 
mastery of production techniques and/or storage techniques, which would have effects 
in product quality and then reduce the profit margin depending on the commune. Also, 
the large margin intervals (minimum-maximum) and the high standard deviations allow 
us to conclude that producers are heterogeneous even within the communes. The 
individual characteristics of each producer could therefore have a considerable effect on 
the performance of the producers. Also being in a landlocked area by adding some 
additional costs (e.g. transport costs) for the buyer could play a role. 
Table 8: Margin 
Department Commune 
Margin after sales 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Mean Median Maximum 
Atacora 
Kérou 126.89 -33.95 246.49 293.52 385.29 
Kouandé 957.02 -4841.59 -81.31 126.75 206 
Natitingou 230.13 101.29 344.38 373 558.86 
Péhunco 1911.91 -12358.91 -128.03 178.89 293.16 
Toucountouna 239.48 96 330.68 281.51 901.52 
Donga 
Bassila 13173.06 -70432.21 -2831.14 142.53 409.95 
Copargo 189.23 15.63 279.72 241.32 708.46 
Djougou 229.78 -184 276.55 214.70 835.20 
Ouaké 4125.45 -23825.2 -750 52.67 928 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
c- Margin and type of buyers 
It is also important to analyse prices/margins according to the type of buyer who 
participated in the cashew marketing year. Graph 7 shows that the main buyers are 
foreign private operators and the local market for those who harvest their product on 
rainy season. But concerning the harvest in dry season, the main buyer’s still local 
market, the national private operators and union. We can assume that foreign buyers 
concerned about complying with government decisions wait until the start of the 
marketing year before making purchases. However, domestic private operators and the 
union proceed earlier with the purchase/collection of cashew nuts. 
The importance of selling on the local market could be interpreted by the financial 
fragility of the producers who would be obliged to sell the products often at low prices 
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to support certain household expenses. This would justify insufficient profit margins to 
meet primary needs as analysed in Table 7. It could also be understood because of the 
lack of supervision/organization of the cashew nut sector in Benin. 
Graph 7: Distribution of buyers by season 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
Table 9 shows that the margins obtained by the producers are positive (considering the 
median) regardless of the buyer (the main ones). However, the margin is slightly higher 
with a lower variance when the buyer is a private foreign operator compared to the other 
main buyers, i.e. the local market, private national operators and the union. This could 
be explained by the fact that foreign private operators are more respectful in government 
decisions waiting for the official marketing period (Graph 7) before buying the products 
by offering higher prices. It could also reflect that the quality of cashew involved is 
















Rainy season 2018 Dry season 2018 Rainy season 2019
Distribution of  buyers by season
Union Local market National private Foreign private
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Table 9: Margin by type of buyers 
Buyers 
Margin 
n sd Minimum Mean Median Maximum 
Rainy season 2018 
Union 1 . 197.52 197.52 197.52 197.52 
Local market 6 291.92 -204.54 371.58 467.09 568.44 
Foreign private 9 166.52 102.24 424.4363 487.83 601.09 
   Dry season 2018 
Union 71 147.32 -301.38 144.93 148.17 901.52 
Local market 103 13921.91 -141051 -1153.12 181.95 743.53 
National private 52 5848.70 -41988.39 -642.53 172.83 835.20 
Foreign private 22 194.77 158.5 287.42 230.25 928 
  Rainy season 2019 
Local market 5 84.13 -36.98 106.48 136.64 174.45 
Foreign private 9 87.21 -64.95 99.08 100.16 244.29 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
d- Harvest and storage 
In analysing the margins obtained in Table 10, we had assumed that a small margin 
could be associated with the lack of storage and production techniques. Concerning 
storage, it can be seen from Table 10 below that after harvest, on average, cashew nuts 
are stored for about 3 months before marketing. Some producers even store for 5 
months. Maybe they store to speculate on the price. But the quality of the nuts and 
explicitly the market power of the producer could therefore be affected if the storage 
conditions are not respected. The relationship between the duration of pre-market 
storage and the profit margins obtained can be analysed further below. The question of 
the way cashew nut collection/marketing is organized in Benin also arises. 
Table 10: Duration of harvesting and storage 
Season 
Duration of harvest (month) 
sd Minimum Mean Median Maximum 
Rainy seaon 2018 .60 2 2.4 2 4 
Dry season 2018 .83 1 2.88 3 5 
Rainy seaon 2019 .47 2 2.29 2 3 
  Pre-sale storage time (month) 
Rainy seaon 2018 1.45 0 2.22 2.25 5 
Dry season 2018 1.02 0 2.18 2 5 
Rainy seaon 2019 1.07 0 2.71 3 4 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
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Through graph 8, we analyse the evolution of the quantities of cashew nuts harvested, 
sold and the sale price over time. It appears that the producers who have the most 
quantity harvested are those who have started harvesting the nuts during the dry season 
(December to February). In fact, they are the most significant during this period. The 
quantity produced evolves from December to peak in February before decreasing until 
April. However, the sale begins between January and February to reach the maximum 
quantity in May, 3 months after the peak obtained for the harvest. This delay between 
these two peaks could negatively affect the market power of producers by deteriorating 
the quality of the products when storage conditions are not respected. However, the 
opposite can be observed through the analysis of the evolution of sales prices over time. 
Prices tend to increase over time, with a peak in June. This trend would be justified by 
the financial difficulties that lead producers to sell their production earlier and at low 
prices (Tandjiekpon, 2010). So, those who store for long time, would try to speculate 
and earn greater profit from their sales. 
Graph 8: Progression of harvested and sold quantity, and price over time 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
e- Sellers and buyers 
The type of seller is defined from the marketing decision (individual or collective) in 
the PO. From graph 9 below, one observes that for the plots submitted for the project 
(plot 1), marketing is collective (81.44%), unlike the other plots (2 and 3) for which the 
marketing of products is individual. The type of sale could influence the market power 
of the producers. Indeed, collective selling through crop pooling would allow producers 
to have a strong bargaining power in the commercialization of cashew nuts. It should 
also be noted that the quantity sold which captures the capacity of the famers to access 
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market does not depend on the type of sale. Independently of the type of seller, the 
quantity harvested is almost totally sold. 
Graph 9: Type of seller and quantity harvested and sold 
 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
The graph 10 highlights the main buyers according to the type of seller (individual or 
collective). Independently of the type of seller (individual or collective), the main buyers 
are the local market, the union and the national private operators. However, the union is 
the main buyer when the sale is made collectively by the producers of a PO. Indeed, 
producer’s union implements the technique of grouped sales for the 
cooperatives/producers affiliated to it. This technique aims to control both the quality of 
the products exchanged and the prices offered to sellers by allowing producers to have 
better incomes. Individual sellers sell their products mainly on the local market.  
Graph 10: Type of buyers by type of sellers 










Local market Union National private Foreign private
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Graph 11 shows the distribution of buyers according to the months of sale and the 
quantities purchased by each type of buyer. In the months with the highest quantities 
sold (April and May), cashew nuts were sold mainly to the producers' union, to private 
domestic and foreign operators and on local markets. These buyers were also the ones 
who bought the largest share of the producers' sales. The quantity purchased could be a 
function of the market power of the buyer. The greater his market power, the greater the 
quantity of cashew nuts he can acquire in the purchasing transactions by controlling the 
value chain. 
Graph 11: Type of cashew buyers and quantity (kg) purchased in the selling months  
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
It appears on graph 12 that foreign buyer’s offers on average the highest purchase price, 
followed by the local market and national private buyers. Indeed, foreign operators 
involved in marketing would be more likely to respect the price set by the government 
and the purchase period indicated (graph 11). Also, contrary to the idea that producers 
sell their product on the local market at low prices to cope with financial difficulties, the 
local market offers on average higher prices than private operators and the union. We 
observe an increasing of the price offer by the local market and the national private 
operators which exhibit the lower price at the beginning of the period. They purchase 
the products at higher price in the time than the foreign private operators and the union 
which offered higher price at the beginning of the period. 
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Graph 12: Average purchase price by buyer and over time  
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
2- Model 
The analysis of the determinants of the markup in this study will be done in three main 
steps. First, we follow the method developed in De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) who 
used the Cobb-Douglas production function and derive the output elasticity of variable 
inputs. The Cobb-Douglas function is presented as a specific case of the Hicks-neutral 
production functions used by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). It is not possible in 
this study to consider the productivity shock over time as in De Loecker and Eeckhout 
(2017) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). In fact, the data used here are not panel 
data (i.e. observed over one time). The analysis is done here at the plot level and we 
assume a common technology across farmers. This implies that output elasticities of 
inputs across farmers are constant in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function. Our 
Cobb-Douglas production function is rewritten by equation 4 below in which, variables 
are normalized by the size of harvested plot. 
𝑄 = 𝑓(𝑉; 𝐹; 𝑃; 𝑊; 𝑆) = 𝑐𝑉𝜃𝐹𝛽𝑃𝛾𝑊𝛿𝑆𝜇 (4), 
with Q = normalized total value of produced cashew nut; V= normalized total value of 
variable inputs used; F= normalized total value of fixed inputs used; P= set of farmer’s 
characteristics (Log of the years of experience, Educated, Received training on 
production, PO is financed by the project); W= set of workers characteristics defined as 
the sex of dominant workers, logarithm of family and non-family labour market; S= 
seed and plot characteristics (Seed quality, Number of years the plot has been in use and 
existence of right to use the plot); and c the production technology. 
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To get the estimation coefficients directly in terms of elasticity, we apply the logarithm 
transformation to equation 4. The result is equation 5 below, which is estimated using 
an OLS regression. So, the elasticities are obtained at the crop (industry) level. 
𝑙𝑛 (𝑄) = 𝛼0 +  𝜃 ln(𝑉) + 𝛽 ln(𝐹) +  𝛾 ln(𝑃) + 𝛿 ln(𝑊) + 𝜇 ln(𝑆) +    (5) 
The coefficients/set of coefficients 𝜃, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜇   represent the elasticities of the output to 
each corresponding variables/set of variables. Second, we measure market power by the 
markup based on the markup estimation method defined by De Loecker and Warzynski 
(2012). Based on the microeconomic equation of minimisation of production costs, this 
method derives the following markup expression. 
Recall expression (3)                    𝜇 =
𝜃𝑋
𝛼𝑋
  ,    
where   μ = the markup; 𝜃𝑋= the output elasticity of variable input X and 𝛼𝑋= the share 
of expenditures on variable inputs X in total sales. The markup is estimated at the 
producer level by dividing the estimated elasticity by the share of expenditures on 
variable inputs X in total sales for each producer. And finally, we regress using a robust 
Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) the markup on the control variables in order to analyse 
the correlation between markup and the characteristics observed from cashew nut 
producers/buyers in the Atacora-Donga region in Benin. Table 11 below includes the 
variables used in the study.  
Table 11: Explanatory variables and expected effects on the markup 
Codes     Explanatory Variables Definition of variables 
Production characteristics  
 
             Production cost 
Variable inputs costs per ha 
Fixed inputs costs per ha 
 
             Production value 
Value of the harvested quantity per ha 
 
 
The markup is expected to increase with the increase of inputs 
expenses 










We expect more experienced and educated famers to produce 
more and have more market power and 
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Codes     Explanatory Variables Definition of variables 
1 if yes; 0 if not 
 
Years of experience in cashew 
 
 
Seed and plot characteristics 
 
Seed quality 
1 if improved seed; 0 if not 
 
Use of the plot 
Number of years the plot has been in 
use 
 
Having a right/prove to use the plot 














Selling characteristics  
 





















This ratio gives the confrontation between supply (production) 
and demand (sales). More, it helps to capture the capacity of the 
farmer to access market. Increasing this ratio would imply an 
increase in the capacity of the producer to access market and meet 





Difference (in terms of month) between the harvest month and the 
sale month. This difference allows to measure the duration of 
storage before marketing. The intuition is that, if the producers do 
not master storage techniques, a long storage period could 
deteriorate the quality of the nuts and reduces the producers' 
market power. However, a long storage period could be seen as 
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Codes     Explanatory Variables Definition of variables 
 
             Type of seller 
0   The sale is done individually. 




             Month of sale 
0   The sale is done before the 
marketing period. 





We expected a positive effect on the markup assuming better 
organization and that the pooling of products would give 





It assumed that producer who sell before the marketing period 
facing a financial problem, so have no bargaining power. This 
could have negative effect on the markup. Those selling during 
the marketing period are supposed to take advantage from the 
announcement of the regulation price sell at high price than the 
later. 
Type of buyers 
 
            Local market 
0   Respondent does not sell to this 
buyer. 
1   Respondent sell to this buyer. 
 
             Famer’s Union 
0   Respondent does not sell to this 
buyer. 
1   Respondent sell to this buyer. 
 
            National private 
0   Respondent does not sell to this 
buyer. 
1   Respondent sell to this buyer. 
 
            Foreign private 
0   Respondent does not sell to this 
buyer. 









The different types of purchasers who bought the respondent's 
production. Intuitively, we expect a negative effect on the farmer's 
profit margin, regardless of the type of buyer. We assume here that 
the “local market” is dominated by the collectors. In fact, it 
captures the type of buyers when farmers do not know enough 
about the buyer who is buying their nuts. We know that the 
collectors are those who, most of the time, live in the production 
areas and have an excellent geographical knowledge of the 
production sites. And farmers do not necessarily know which 
wholesalers these collectors work with. 
Finance and training 
 
             Loan  in process 
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Codes     Explanatory Variables Definition of variables 
0   No 
1   Yes 
 
 
           Training undertaken 
0   No 
1   Yes 
 
 
            PO financed 
0   No 
1   Yes 
The respondent's situation in terms of a loan still to be repaid from 
any creditor. An existing credit would reduce the market power of 
the producer by imposing constraints on him that would lead him 
to sell his production without being rational. 
 
Has the respondent received training on:  Mastery of technical 
production methods, Economic performance and Techniques for 
the transformation of agricultural products? Having a training is 
supposed to positively influence level of production and also 
market power. 
 
Has the PO to which the respondent is a member received financial 
support from Belgian Development Agency or not? Being a 
member of a PO that has received financial support could have a 
positive effect on market power by reducing constraints and 
facilitating training at producer level. 
 
Source: by author 
 
V- Empirical Results 
1- Estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function 
As indicated in the methodology above, we draw on De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) 
and Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to analyse the correlation between markup and 
observed characteristics in cashew nut producers in the Atacora-Donga region of Benin. 
In a first step, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function in order to obtain the 
elasticity of the output with respect to variable inputs. Table 123 shows of the results. 
We can see that the variable inputs are the most significant inputs in cashew nut 
production in the Atacora-Donga region.  An increase in the value of variable inputs by 
1% increases the value of output by 0.68%.  Fixed inputs have also positive effect on 
the production but are not statistically significant. These results would be explained by 
the fact that producers do not invest significant resources in terms of production 
technologies, mastery of production technique and plantation maintenance 
(Tandjiekpon, 2010). As shown by Houssa4 et al (2018) for rice farmers in Benin, we 
find that the adoption of improved seeds contributes significantly to increased 
 
3 For more details see Annex 1. Only significant results are show here 
4 In a Befind 2018 working paper draft 
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production. The value of the output may be affected by the age of the trees, which is not 
considered in this study. As the plots are generally (about 85%) inherited according to 
the study data, it is assumed that the plantations are not necessarily renewed. This could 
explain why fixed inputs are not significant. The negative effect observed for farmers 
who have the right/proof to use the plot could also be justified by a correlation with the 
inherited characteristic of the plots. The results show no significant effect for individual 
farmer and worker characteristics for cashew nut production. controlling for plots fixed 
effects does not also influence the results. 
Table 12: Estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
Robust OLS results for Cobb-Douglas production function: regress logarithm of the value of 
production on the value of inputs (variables and fixed) and farmer's, seed, worker's and land 
characteristics 
 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the value production per ha (1) (2) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       















 (0.291) (0.285) 
   Logarithm of value of fixed inputs per ha 0.027 0.024 
 (0.044) (0.048) 
 
Seed and plot characteristics 







 (0.627) (0.663) 
    Having a right of use the plot (1 if yes; 0 if not) -0.714* -0.694* 
 (0.399) (0.401) 
   
Plot effect No Yes 
   
Nbr of Obs. 119 119 
R-squared 0.410 0.411 
F-stat 2.921 2.502 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
2- The markup estimation and correlated factors 
The second step in the analysis is to estimate the markup for each farmer by dividing 
the elasticity of the value of the output with respect to the value of the variable input by 
the share of the variable input in the farmer's sales income. The table 13 below presents 
the results of the regression of the markup on some observed characteristics which are 
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the farmer’s characteristics, the production characteristics, the different type of buyer, 
the selling characteristics, the situation of famer about finance and training. For the 
analysis we focus on the sign and significance5 of the coefficients. 
Table 13: Correlation between markup and the farmer’s observed characteristics 
 
Robust OLS results for markup's determinants: regress logarithm of the markup on the 
production, farmers, finance and training, selling and buyer’s characteristics 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of markup (1) (2) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
















 (0.034) (0.034) 
   Logarithm of value of fixed inputs per ha 0.039** 0.043** 
 (0.019) (0.021) 
 
Farmer’s characteristics 







 (0.158) (0.160) 
 
Finance and training 







 (0.389) (0.387) 
   The PO of belonging was financed by the project (1 if yes; 0 if not) 0.406* 0.406** 
 (0.208) (0.206) 
 
Selling characteristics 







 (0.096) (0.101) 
   Month of sale (1 if sold in the marketing period; 0 if not) 0.399** 0.392** 
 (0.158) (0.154) 
 
Type of buyer 







 (0.114) (0.113) 
   
Plot effect No Yes 
 
Nbr of Obs. 280 280 
R-squared 0.740 0.740 
F-stat 60.166 53.050 
Source: by author with ENABEL/ACROPOLIS-BeFinD data 
 
5 For more details see annex 2. Only significant results are show here 
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a- Production characteristics 
As regards expenditures on inputs for production, the regression results show that 
expenditures on variable inputs has a negative effect on the farmer's markup. The 
opposite effect is observed with fixed inputs expenditures. The markup increases with 
fixed expenses. The importance of variable inputs in production (Table 12) reinforces 
these results. In fact, based on the expression of the markup (expression 3) derived by 
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), farmers with low expenditures on fixed inputs would 
be constrained to increase their expenditures on variable inputs (expenditure on fixed 
inputs corresponding to an improvement in technology). And consequently, these 
farmers would have a low markup. However, an increase in spending on fixed inputs 
would improve the technology and therefore reduce spending on variable inputs, and 
thus increase the markup. It is in this sense that De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) 
concluded that the markup helps to identify the role of technology in market power. So, 
increasing fixed inputs and thus improving technology would allow the producer to 
increase his market power. 
b- Farmer's characteristics 
It appears that being educated and having more experiences have a positive effect, but 
this effect is not statistically significant on the markup. We observe significant and 
positive effect for the sex of the farmer. Being a female helps to take advantage by 
increasing the markup. This would be explained by the fact that there are higher 
investments (fixed and variable costs) on average for women compared to men. Also 
unobserved characteristics (e.g. the ability to negotiate a better selling price) could drive 
this effect. 
c- Finance and training 
Having outstanding loans has a negative effect on the farmers' markup.  According to 
Soglo and Assogba (2009), Tandjiekpon (2010) and   Swinnen et al. (2013), farmers to 
meet production expenses and certain social problems receive credit from potential 
buyers (most of the time through purchasing contracts) or other sources. They are 
therefore obliged to sell off their production in order to meet their commitments to 
creditors. They would therefore tend to receive low prices and therefore a low markup.  
Concerning the fact that the PO is financed by the PROFI project, the results show a 
positive effect on markup. Belonging to a PO financed by the project would therefore 
alleviate the financial constraint faced by the farmer as a result of the investments 
received. It will be interesting to better understand the effect of this variable through a 
before-after comparison of the project. 
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d- Selling characteristics 
It appears that farmers in POs where marketing is organised individually perform better 
than those where sales are organised collectively. It could be assumed that farmers who 
sell individually would have better quality cashew nuts or a better structured sales 
network with well-defined contracts that force them to sell to specific buyers and get 
better prices. Also, the mode of internal governance of the PO to which the farmer is a 
member could matter for its ability to have a certain level of markup. Maybe there are 
some specific characteristics that driven the negative effect of negative sales. A specific 
characteristic could be who decides where and to whom PO members should sell. 
However, without data on the quality of the cashew nuts traded and any contracts 
established, we cannot make clear conclusions on these results. 
Sell in the official marketing period helps farmers to increase theirs markup compared 
to those who sell before this period. We show in graphs 3, 4 and 5 that the regulatory 
price set by the government is not systematically applied during sales. However, it could 
have an effect on the prices applied during cashew nut sales operations. It could be 
interpreted as a signal from the government by the farmer and give them more 
bargaining power. This is what Russo et al. (2011) argue by showing that fix a minimum 
farm price prevents buyers from exercising their market power in an oligopsony 
situation. Even if we find a non-significant effect of the storage duration on the farmers' 
markup, it will be important to help farmers by improving their capacity and storage 
conditions. Soglo and Assogba (2009) identified the storage as a problem for the sector. 
And in this case, farmers cannot therefore store and wait for the marketing period to 
speculate on price. 
e- Type of buyers 
The regression shows that compare to local market, the union have negative effect on 
farmer’s markup. Farmers would therefore be disadvantaged in the sharing of rents vis-
à-vis to their union compare to when they sell to local market. The negative effect 
observed here for the union explain the results find previously concerning the type of 
seller. Indeed, we found that individual sellers are doing better than collective sellers. 
And this is reinforced by the graph 10 where, we see that, the individual sellers sold 
mainly to local market compare to collective sellers who sold to the union. So, there is 
some heterogeneous result concerning the effects of intermediaries on the rents sharing 
or on the farmer’s markup. Consistent with the results of Huang and Sexton (1996), 
Alston et al. (1997) and Sexton (2012), we can argue that the presence of intermediaries 
in the agriculture sector disadvantage farmers (the case of union here). Contrary to these 
studies showing the negative effect of intermediaries, our results show a positive effect 
of the local market on the farmers' markup. There are therefore specific characteristics 
Advanced Master in International and Development Economics 
Personal Project – EDEVM350 
 
  
Sourou Marius OLODO 40 
 
of each buyer that influence the farmers' markup. A study on the definition of the markup 
at the level of the different actors in the sector (including intermediaries/buyers) would 
be necessary to isolate the specificities of each actor at each level of the marketing chain. 
 
VI- Conclusion 
The structuring of trade through globalization is subject to studies that try to highlight 
the consequences on the well-being and/or the rent of producers in developing countries. 
Some studies show benefits (Minten et al., 2007; Murthy, 2011) for farmers while 
others, on the contrary, have shown negative effects (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2011; 
Richard 2012; Maertens and Swinnen, 2014; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018). Whether 
positive or negative, the effects of farmers' participation in international trade are a 
consequence of their ability to have some market power or a high markup. Richard 
(2012) and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) have shown that market power depends on 
the characteristics of each producer who benefits differently from globalization.  
However, these producers in developing countries are involved in international market 
trade through their dealings with buyers/exporters on the domestic market who act in an 
oligopsony situation. In this study, we focused on these interactions in the domestic 
cashew nuts market in Benin in order to highlight the characteristics of farmers that 
significantly affect their markup. 
As a result, the study shows that farmers' markup is higher for women. This allows to 
assume a possible unobserved variable. In line with De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) 
who argue that the markup identifies the role of technology in market power, the results 
of our study show that farmers' markup would increase with fixed input expenditure and 
a decrease in variable input expenditure (synonymous with better technology). Further 
than Richard (2012) and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018), we find that in addition to 
the characteristics of the producer, the type of buyer also matters for the markup. 
Contrary to idea that the presence of intermediaries is harmful for farmers (Alston et al., 
1997; Sexton, 2012), we find a positive effect for local market. But negative effect 
consistent with these studies is find when the intermediary is union. Another constraint 
on the markup is observed when farmers have outstanding loans. Farmers would be 
forced to sell their products even at low prices to meet their financial requirements. 
However, this financial constraint could be mitigated with the positive effect on markup 
when the PO is financed by the project PROFI. The negative effect observed when sales 
are made collectively in relation to farmers who sold individually allows us to assume 
that the internal governance of the POs of which the farmers are members also plays an 
important role on the profit margin.  Figure 10 shows that farmers who sell collectively 
are those who sold mainly to the union, which has a negative effect on the markup. On 
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the other hand, those selling individually sold their product mainly on the local market 
which has a positive effect on the farmers' markup. Also, the marketing period have 
positive effect on farmer’s markup. The marketing price define by the government 
would allow farmer to increase their bargaining power even if this minimum price is not 
enforced on the field. 
In conclusion, the regression results show that the markup is influenced by the 
producer's characteristics, the production characteristics, the type of buyer, the selling 
period and to some extent by the internal governance of the PO to which he belongs. 
Any policy, reform or programme aimed at improving the cashew value chain for the 
benefit of farmers will need to take actions at three possible levels. Firstly, improving 
the institutional framework of the sector in order to make each actor comply with 
government decisions in the sector (respect of regulation price and purchasing standards, 
respect of collection and marketing periods and formal identification of collectors and 
buyers). Secondly, it is necessary to improve the individual capacities of producers to 
take advantage of the benefits of globalization through exported agricultural products. 
This means supporting them in the usefulness of increasing investments in the renewal 
and/or maintenance of plantations and in the improvement of their production and 
storage techniques. Thirdly, to carry out actions aimed at improving internal governance 
in POs in order to increase their market power vis-à-vis buyers and improve the well-
being of farmers. These recommendations are in line with the four following specific 
results/objectives defined by Enabel-Benin in the PROFI project. 
- Result 1: Professionalized family farms offer a competitive product in clearly 
identified growth markets. 
- Result 2: Rural businesses provide quality services accessible to farms in the 
commodity chains. 
- Result 3: Communal infrastructures are built and developed following a 
concerted process between the actors of the sectors. 
- Result 4: The governance and performance of the priority sectors are improved 
thanks to a better articulation of the operators, with respect for the environment 
and gender equity. 
But a before-after analysis is important to determine what worked well or poorly 
during implementation. This will help to improve future interventions by both 
development actors and government in the sector. 
The work only focuses on the correlation between markup and the independent 
variables. However, it could be improved by doing a before and after the project 
analysis. This kind of analysis will help to also to quantify the level of the effects of the 
independent variables. Also, results could be improved by controlling for some variables 
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not existence in the data base. Such variables could be for instance the age of the cashew 
trees, the quality of the nuts (KOR), the indicators specific to the internal governance of 
the POs and the characteristics of each buyer. They could affect both the level of 
production and the level of the markup. Finally, to generalize the results, the sample size 
could be increased. In fact, our study is based on 261 cashew producers out of an 
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VIII- Annex 
Annex 1: Results of the estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function 
 
Robust OLS results for Cobb-Douglas production function: regress logarithm of the value of 
production on the value of inputs (variables and fixed) and farmer's, seed, worker's and land 
characteristics 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the value production per ha (1) (2) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       












 (0.291) (0.285) 
   Logarithm of value of fixed inputs per ha 0.027 0.024 
 (0.044) (0.048) 
Farmer’s characteristics 





 (0.724) (0.742) 
   Educated (1 if yes; 0 if not) -0.312 -0.306 
 (0.350) (0.356) 
   Received training about production (1 if yes; 0 if not) -0.058 -0.040 
 (0.161) (0.164) 
   The PO of belonging was financed by the project (1 if yes; 0 if not) 0.661 0.686 
 (0.614) (0.621) 
Worker’s characteristics 





 (0.202) (0.203) 
   Logarithm of family labour force 0.921 0.920 
 (0.593) (0.608) 
   Logarithm of non-family labour force -0.221 -0.226 
 (0.207) (0.215) 
Seed and plot characteristics 





 (0.627) (0.663) 
   Logarithm of the number of years the plot has been in use 0.901 0.938 
 (0.595) (0.622) 
   Having a right of use the plot (1 if yes; 0 if not) -0.714* -0.694* 
 (0.399) (0.401) 
Constant 3.877 3.818 
 (3.545) (3.584) 
   
Plot effect No Yes 
Nbr of Obs. 119 119 
R-squared 0.410 0.411 
F-stat 2.921 2.502 
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Annex 2: Correlation between markup and farmer’s observed characteristics 
 
Robust OLS results for markup's determinants: regress logarithm of the markup on the 
production, farmers, finance and training, selling and buyer’s characteristics 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of markup (1) (2) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       













 (0.034) (0.034) 
   Logarithm of value of fixed inputs per ha 0.039** 0.043** 
 (0.019) (0.021) 
Farmer’s characteristics 





 (0.158) (0.160) 
   Educated (1 if yes; 0 if not) 0.032 0.029 
 (0.090) (0.093) 
   Logarithm of years of experience in cashew 0.064 0.062 
 (0.111) (0.112) 
Finance and training 





 (0.389) (0.387) 
   Received training about commercialization (1 if yes; 0 if not) -0.202 -0.205 
 (0.127) (0.131) 
   The PO of belonging was financed by the project (1 if yes; 0 if not) 0.406* 0.406** 
 (0.208) (0.206) 
Selling characteristics 





 (0.096) (0.101) 
   Sale ratio relative to production 0.226 0.241 
 (0.164) (0.178) 
   Number of month the product is stored before sold 0.064 0.067 
 (0.055) (0.056) 
   Month of sale (1 if sold in the marketing period; 0 if not) 0.399** 0.392** 
 (0.158) (0.154) 
Type of buyer 





 (0.114) (0.113) 
   National private (1 if sell to this buyer; 0 if not) 0.191 0.184 
 (0.140) (0.139) 
   Foreign private (1 if sell to this buyer; 0 if not) 0.066 0.065 
 (0.174) (0.175) 
Constant 8.971*** 8.941*** 
 0.511 0.523 
   
Plot effect No Yes 
Nbr of Obs. 280 280 
R-squared 0.740 0.740 
F-stat 60.166 53.050 
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